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Abstract
The status of the United States market and economy
can be partially blamed on the credit rating agencies'
actions and failure to change. The SEC needs to
implement change now with greater regulation and
monitoring of the NRSROs. The Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act should do more than open the doors for
great competition. Consumer and investor confidence
will only increase when the SEC, CRARA and credit
rating agencies agree to a level of accountability for
rating stocks, bonds and companies.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is no surprise to say the financial markets today are in upheaval
with the sub-prime mortgage predicament impacting areas beyond itself.
Though not the sole answer to the problems with the market, the credit
rating agencies play a large role in some of the foundational issues in the
markets today. Calls from hesitant investors require the credit rating
agencies to be not only regulated more from within, but from Congressional
action as well.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II provides background
information about the history of rating agencies as well as the governmental
intervention and regulations. Part III describes the basics of obtaining a
rating, what the ratings systems are, and how the ratings systems work. Part
III also discusses how the ratings failed the market, namely in the mortgage
sector, which has spread to affect the majority of the economy. Part IV
discusses the problems within the credit rating agency market, and is
followed by possible solutions to those problems in Part V. Part VI
provides potential solutions to this issue and Part VII concludes the Note.
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE RATINGS AGENCIES
A. The Beginnings
It is fitting for the credit rating industry to undergo a renovation as
2009 will mark the industry's 10 0th year of being in service. Bond ratings
first became available in 1909, when John Moody founded Moody's
Investment Service, a unit of Moody's Corporation (Moody's). At the time,
companies were in the need of more capital than they could raise through
traditional means. The rating agencies were able to facilitate the process by
aiding investors with company appraisals and the benefits or costs of
investing in said company.1 The foundational business model for ratings
agencies revolves around "predicting default probabilities for all kinds of
debt securities and debt issuers." 2  Through this business model, rating
agencies also grant market licenses, for without the rating, many
investments would hit enormous market entry barriers.3 Today, Moody's
operates in over 100 sovereign nations with over 9,300 customer accounts.4
In 2006, Moody's received $2.037 billion in revenue, with a net income of
$753.9 million.5
Standard and Poor's (S&P) formed in 1941 through the merger of
two bond rating agencies: Poor's Publishing (started rating in 1916) and
Standard Statistics Company (in 1922).6 S&P was later taken over by the
publishing company McGraw Hill in the 1960s.7 In 2006, S&P received
$2.75 billion in revenue. 8 In the same year, S&P rated over 495,000
ratings, 223,000 of which were new, the remainder consisting of revised
ratings. 9 Together, Moody's and S&P comprise nearly eighty percent of
the debt-rating market. 10
Hill, Claire. Regulating the Rating Agencies. WASH. U. LAW QUARTERLY, Vol. 82, p
43, 2007, at 46, http://ssrn.com/abstract+452022 (last visited 9/21/08).2 Dittrich, Fabian. The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation, page 9,
http://ssm.com/abstract-991821. (last visited on 11/17/08).
'Id. at 9.
4 About Moody's. http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/About
Moodys.aspx? topic=intro&redir url=/cust/AboutMoodys/staticRedirect.asp (last
visited on 11/17/08).
5 Moody's 2006 Annual Report, Page 4, available at http://library.corporate-
ir.net/library/ 12/123/123831 /items/23688 1 / annualreport2006.pdf.6 White, Lawrence. A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry -for Better or for Worse?
Law & Economics Research Paper Series. Working Paper No. 07-09. February 2007,
?age 2.
Hill, supra note 1, at 46.
8 S&P Fact Sheet. Page 1.
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/FactSheetGeneral_091907.pdf.
9 Id. at 1.
'0 Rupini Bergstrom, Bond Raters Get Subpoenas, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2007, at B2.
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In 1941, Fitch Ratings, now a unit of Fimalac SA, a French
conglomerate in Paris, joined the fray, rounding off the top three ratings
agencies. 1   Fitch Ratings comprises smaller agencies including Fitch,
IBCA, Duff & Phelps, and Thomson BankWatch.12 In 2006, Fitch Ratings
contributed eighty-five percent of Fimalac's revenue, accounting for nearly
$567 million in revenue. 13
The impact of these three rating agencies can be felt through the
knowledge that most bonds traded on the public market and most industrial
companies are rated by these agencies; the majority sometimes requires two
ratings-mainly Moody's and S&P. 14 Reports state "Moody's rates 78% of
the industrial companies in the United States, while Standard & Poor's rates
66%."'51 Additionally, ninety-nine percent of the bonds and preferred stock
publicly traded in the United States is rated by S&P. 16 Moody's, on the
other hand, rates more than 90% of the public market in bonds that are
investment grade. 17 A New York Times columnist even declared "Moody's
as one of the two superpowers in the world, the other superpower being the
United States."' 18 This type of power, consequently, makes it impossible
for bonds and stock to be bought without being rated by one of the three
major named agencies. In Congressional hearings, Senator Joseph
Lieberman commented on the power by stating:
The credit rates hold the key to capital and liquidity, the
lifeblood of corporate American and of our capitalist
economy. The rating affects a company's ability to borrow
money; it affects whether a pension fund or a money
11 White, supra note 6, at 2.
12 Hill, supra note 1, at 47.
13 Fimalac Annual Report. Page 61.
http://www.prline.com/rootMRI/3794/docsMRI/Rapportannuel2006anglais.pdf.
(Fimalac reported C383.6 million as the fiscal 2006 revenue, accounting for nine
months of the 2006 year, with its year end in September. The E383.6 million converts
roughly to $567,229,065 in U.S. dollars.)
14 Hill, supra note 1, at 48.
15 See New Interests, New Conflicts, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, Finance and
Economics, at 2001 WL 7318498.
16 Rating the Ratings Agencies: The State of Transparency and Competition: Hearing
Before the Capital Markets Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee
(Transparency and Competition Hearing), 10 8'h Congress. 219-230 (2003)
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/1 08-18pdf.
17 Moody's.com, Products and Services brochure - Corporate Research, available at
http://www.moodys.com/cust/prodserv/prodservdetail.aspp= 1 &c=l (last visited on
11/17/08).
18 Hill, supra note 1, at 47 (quoting an Interview with Thomas Friedman, The
MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1996)).
2008]
158 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W [Vol. 3:1
JOURNAL
market fund can invest in a company's bonds; and it affects
stock price. 19
As powerful presences in the financial markets, both in the United
States and internationally, the ratings agencies must have a degree of
accountability to both the markets and companies served, as well as to the
investors relying on the appraisal information provided.
B. Federal Intervention and Regulation
In 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") desired
to use the ratings agencies to ensure that the broker-dealers it regulated had
capital requirements so as to not expend its own resources researching
every bond itself 2 ° As a result, the category of Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations ("NRSROs") was born out of the SEC. 21
Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings were all grandfathered into the NRSRO
category, granting each organization the ability to rate bonds. This all
important status should be highlighted as regulated financial institutions
must follow the NRSRO ratings in order to invest in bonds. 22 However,
that the SEC "never intended or expected that the nationally recognized
statistical rating organization concept [NRSRO] would become so widely
relied upon."
23
Achieving an NRSRO status since 1975 has been exceedingly
difficult, as the process has been unclear, leaving the designation to serve as
24a barrier to entry for market participants. Since the inception of NRSROs,
eight agencies have received that designation, through February 2003.25
Due to buyouts and mergers, however, the numbers quickly dwindled back
down to essentially the main three. While the process of obtaining an
NRSRO designation is opaque, the SEC has stated that it considers the
following criteria:
'9 Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs (Enron Hearing), 10 7th Cong. 116 (2002), available at
http://govt-aff.senate.gov/0320021ieberman.htm (last visited on 1/22/09).
20 White, supra note 6, at 4.
21 Buttonwood, Credit and Blame, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2007, at 77.
22 Mr. Jack White, A Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee; Subject: The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime
Credit Markets. Sept. 26, 2007.
23 A Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee: The Role
and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets (Impact of
Credit Agencies), Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Senator Shelby).
24 Lawrence White, A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry, REGULATION, Spring
2007, at 50.
25 Transparency and Competition Hearing, supra note 16.
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The organizational structure of the rating organization, the
rating organization's financial resources . . . , the size and
experience of training of the rating organization's staff....
the rating organization's independence from companies it
rates, the rating organization's rating procedures . . . , and
whether the rating organization has internal procedures to
prevent the misuse of non-public information and whether
those procedures are followed.26
Additionally, the most important criteria includes the agency being
"nationally recognized" for its ratings reliability. 27 This aspect leads to an
inevitable Catch-22: "an agency has to be nationally recognized to be an
NRSRO but has to be an NRSRO to become nationally recognized.
28
Consequently, barriers to market entry and competition are hatched through
the SEC's lack of discernable regulatory definitions of NRSRO
designations and clarity within its own structure for evaluating potential
market participants.
III. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF RATINGS
The NRSRO ratings are supposedly designed to relate to only one
area-"the likelihood that rated securities will default., 2 9 According to
both Moody's and S&P, a rating is the firm's opinion of the credit quality
or general credit worthiness of an issuer's debt security or financial
obligation.30 Ratings are not agency recommendations of whether or not to
invest or not in a certain company or security.
31
The following chart lists the grades from S&P on the left hand side,
and the probability that the investment will meet its financial commitment
on the right hand (i.e., not default). There are ten ratings in all, falling into
two categories: investment grades or speculative grades. Among the
gradations, there are pluses and minuses that add even more levels of
26 Enron Hearing, supra note 19.27 id.
28 Hill, supra note 1, at 55.
29 Ms. Vickie Tillman, A Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee; Subject: The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime
Credit Markets. Sept. 26, 2007. See also Hearing of the Capital Markets, FEDERAL
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 27, 2007; and Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 26, 2007.
30 S&P Credit Ratings Fact Sheet, supra note 8, at 1; Moody's Rating System, at 1,
available at http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/mdcdocs/
24/2005700000433096.pdf. For the purposes of defining the rating system, Moody's
and S&P's approaches will be the focus, as these firms are the most renowned in the
market.
31 See S&P Credit Ratings Fact Sheet, supra note 8, at 1; See Moody's Rating System,
supra note 30, at 1.
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predicted reliability against default. The ratings are a formal part of the
financial system through the actions of regulators, including the SEC and
banks.32
Credit Ratings Gradations 33
AAA Extremely Strong
AA Very Strong
A Strong
BBB Adequate Protection
BBB- Adequate Protection
Speculative Grades (or "Junk")
BB Less Vulnerable
B More Vulnerable
CCC Currently Vulnerable
CC Highly Vulnerable
C Currently Highly Vulnerable
D In Default
For Moody's, the chart looks relatively similar, except that instead
of pluses and minuses within a certain grade, numbers are associated with
the letters so that its system resembles the chart below. 34
Investment Grade
Aaa Highest rating, representing
minimum credit risk
Aal
Aa2 High-grade
Aa3
Al Upper-Medium Grade
32 Buttonwood, supra note 21, at 77.
33 Henry, David. Anatomy of a Ratings Downgrade: How S&P and Moody's
miscalculated risk on two top-rated pools of mortgage-backed bonds. BUSINESSWEEK,
Oct. 1, 2007 at 66.
34 Moody's Rating System, supra note 29, at 2.
Investment Grades
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Combined, the two rating systems aid investors ranging from
individuals to businesses to pension fund managers, in their evaluation of
an investment's safety. However, the majority of investments are not rated
on an unsolicited basis; instead, issuers pay the ratings agencies to appraise
its security or investment.
A. How the Securities Are Rated
In the typical life of a security, the issuer first sells the debt security
to an investor-a higher predicted creditworthiness correlates to a higher
investment given for the security. 35 At that point the rating agency receives
payment from the issuer, along with information, in order for the rating
agency to evaluate and subsequently rate the issuer's creditworthiness.
36
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A2
A3
Baal
Baa2 Medium Grade
Baa3
Speculative Grade
Bal
Ba2 Speculative Elements
Ba3
BI
B2 Subject to high credit risk
B3
Caal
Caa2 Bonds of poor standing
Caa3
Ca Highly speculative, or near
default
C Lowest rating, bonds typically
in default, little prospect for
recovery of principal or interest
35 Dittrich, supra note 2 at 10.36 1d. at 10.
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The following chart follows the flow of information, reputation and money
through the three main categories of actors-issuers, credit rating agencies
and investors.
37
Credit rating agency's reputation
Investment (trust in rating)
According to an S&P press release, its ratings are based on:
business fundamentals, including the issuer's industry,
prospects for growth and its vulnerability to technological
change or regulatory action; .. .economic strength of a
country; . . . the political system and the social
environment; ...prior financial statements, financial and
cash flow projections, transaction documents, supporting
legal opinions and other relevant data.38
Additionally, the team assigned within the rating agency to give a
rating meets with the issuer's management to discuss "operating and
financial plans and management policies., 39 From there a rating is issued.
37 Id.
38 S&P Credit Ratings Fact Sheet, supra note 8, at 3.
39 Id. at 3.
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Moody's advocates a universal approach to risk analysis. 40  Moody's
Rating System press release advocates its use of the following in assigning
a rating:
publicly available data, e.g., annual reports; prospectuses,
offering circulars, offering memoranda, trust deeds or
indentures of particular securities; market data, e.g., stock
price trends, trading volume, data on bond price spreads;
economic data from industry groups, associations or bodies
... ; data from agencies, such as central banks, ministries,
or regulators; books or articles from academic source,
financial journals, news reports; discussions with expert
sources in industry, government, or academia; data that
may come from meetings or conversations with the debt
issuer.41
On the surface, both Moody's and S&P use essentially the same data in
placing the issuers on each agencies spectrum of ratings.
Once the initial rating is given though, the process does not stop, at
least it is not supposed to. Historically, the agencies do well in terms of
initial ratings, but falter when in comes to ongoing ratings.42 Surveillance
of the rated investments is theoretically to continue according to the
agencies procedures; S&P states that it conducts surveillance formally once
a year when meeting with the issuer's management. 43 Notably in recent
years, failure of useful and thorough surveillance allowed Enron to
maintain an "investment grade" rating with both Moody's and S&P until
five days before Enron filed for bankruptcy. 44 Similar situations occurred
with WorldCom and with regard to the Asian Flu crisis, where the
downgrade came too late.45
Both Moody's and S&P employ systems to consider a change in
rating, either upgrading or downgrading.46 Once circumstances contradict
the current rating or underlying support information, Moody's will place a
rating on the Watchlist and this review can include possible upgrade or
40 Moody's Rating Approach,
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/AboutMoodys.aspx?topic =
rapproach (last visited on 11/17/08).
41 Moody's Rating System, supra note 29 at 2.
42 Hill, supra note I at 68.
43 S&P Credit Ratings Fact Sheet, supra note 8, at 3.
44 White, supra note 24, at 50.
45 Hill, supra note 1, at 46.
46 See S&P Credit Ratings Fact Sheet, supra note 8, at 3; see also Understanding
Moody's Corporate Bond Ratings and Rating Process, Page 7,
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/06/2001400000
389218.pdf?frameOfRef-corporate (last visited on 11/17/08). S&P calls this system
"CreditWatch," while Moody's refers to it as "Watchlist."
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downgrade. 47 Under the Moody's regime, a formal committee confers with
the issuing firm's management once placed on the Watchlist to garner
information in order to determine a change in rating.a Moody's estimates
between sixty-six and seventy-six percent of its ratings have changed in the
same direction as suggested by the Watchlist committee.49 S&P follows
essentially the same process with its CreditWatch system-invoking
analysis, a potential meeting with the issuing firm's management, and
subsequent recommendation to the rating committee.50
Both the initial rating and the subsequent surveillance of an
investment in each rating agency rely on "the best information available at
the time," according to Vickie Tillman, the chief rating officer of S&P. 5I
The chart below illustrates Moody's "Default Cumulative Accuracy
Profile," obtained through a 2002 press release issued as a special comment
to its rating policy for both customers and investors alike.52 Additionally,
Moody's indicates that since 1983 90% of all rated companies that have
defaulted "were rated Ba3 or lower at the beginning of the year in which
they defaulted, and almost 80% were rated Ba3 or lower at the beginning of
the fifth year before they defaulted. 53
Exhibit 5
1-Year & 5-Year Default Cumulative Accuracy Profile
0)100%-
95%-
.85%-
" 75%-
- 65%-
55%
!45%-
35%-
S25%-
15%-
E % cumulative share of issuers
0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 10% 80% 90% 100%
Caa-C B3 B2 81 Ba3 Ba2 Bal Baa3 Baa2 Baal A3 A2 Al Aa3 Aa2 Aal Aaa
.... 1 year horizon - 5-year horizon
However, investors are witnessing drastically different trends nearly
every week in newspapers and newscasts alike. As of December 21, 2007,
47 Understanding Moody's Corporate Bond Ratings and Rating Process, supra note 45,
at 7.48 Id. at 7.
49 
Id. at 7.
50 See S&P Credit Ratings Fact Sheet, supra note 8, at 3.
5' Allan Sloan, House of Junk, FORTUNE. Oct. 29, 2007, at 117.52 Understanding Moody's Corporate Bond Ratings and Rating Process, supra note 45,
at 10.
51 Id. at 9.
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The Wall Street Journal reported S&P had lowered ratings on 1,078
investments as a direct result of the mortgage market. 54  The investments
affected comprise $68.16 billion.55 The new year has brought an additional
200 ratings downgrades, adding just under another $20 billion to the group
of investments affected by the change in rating. 56 S&P is not alone in the
trend of downgrading ratings; Moody's and Fitch have both participated in
the process as well.
B. Ratings Failure
Though the ratings are claimed to only provide investors with
information on the possibility of default, many, including professional
financers and laymen alike, have relied on the credit ratings as a basis for
their own investment decisions.57 For buyers of securities there are two
options for analyzing her investments: (1) the prospectus, which includes
company information, financials and other public records, or (2) the credit
agencies. 58 The majority of people will take option number two. 59
As a result, the credit ratings agencies have helped to fuel the
current sub-prime mortgage disarray, though admittedly these agencies are
not the sole cause. Ratings firms have become an essential part of the
financial market, including the mortgage sector. Financial stability is the
goal, with an important segment of that stability being confidence from the
participating actors in the system. 60 In the mortgage context, homeowners
would borrow from mortgage bankers only to have those loans resold to
firms. 6' The mortgage loans would then be repackaged as part of securities,
often referred to as collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"), which were
then evaluated by the ratings firms, given a grade and sold to investors.
62
Through providing top ratings to security investments comprised of
54 Shwiff, Kathy. S&P, Fitch Reduce CDO Ratings. WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 119826225072045517.html (last visited on 11/ 17/08).
As of December 12, 2007, The Wall Street Journal reported that S&P had lowered
ratings on 991 investments as a direct result of the mortgage market. That particular
day alone, 156 ratings, linked to $6.84 billion, were downgraded. See also Barris,
Mike. S&P Slashes its Ratings on $6.8 Billion in CDOs. WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB 11979921858693674 l.html (last visited on 11/ 17/08).
" Shwiff, supra note at 54.
56 Id.
57 Sen. Charles Schumer. A Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee; Subject: The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime
Credit Markets. Sept. 26, 2007.
58 Sloan, supra note 51, at 117.59 1d. at 117.
60 Dittrich, supra note 2, at 9.
6' Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannell, Ratings Firms: A Dollar Short and a Day Late?,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2007, at Al.621 Id. at Al.
2008]
166 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 3:1
JOURNAL
"questionable loans, the firms were able to make the securities seem as safe
as a Treasury Bond.",
63
Problems arose when homeowners began to default on their
mortgages due to two other causes of the sub-prime mess: adjustable rate
mortgages kicking in and homeowners simply living too far above their
allowable income.64 The default rates came in much higher than the credit
ratings agencies predicted, causing a severe downgrading of CDO
investments, as well as backlash against the ratings agencies as investors
lost confidence in the ratings themselves.65 Only six nonfinancial U.S.
firms are still rated AAA, down from 25 in 1992 and 12 in 2002: United
Parcel Service Inc. (ratings are in doubt), Pfizer Inc. (ratings are in doubt),
Exxon Mobil Corp., Automatic Data Processing Inc., General Electric Co.,
and Johnson & Johnson.66 In the financial sector, the number of top rated
firms as "AAA" is down to 53 as opposed to 61 in 2002 and 76 in 1997.67
As of October 27, 2007, Moody's Investors Service, S&P and Fitch had
downgraded over $50 billion in mortgage-backed securities.68 The loss of
investor confidence and subsequent call for greater transparency in the
ratings system came with these downgrades, and hit hardest when some of
the CDOs and other securities fell from a AAA grade at least four levels to
junk.69 For example, Moody's took a AAA-rated, $873 million CDO down
ten steps to a Moody's junk rating of Bal.7
The 2006-2007 credit ratings agency failure in the mortgage market
sector is not the first time these agencies have failed the broader economy
and investors and the economy. 1  Some of the failures include: Penn
Central bankruptcy (1970), New York City financial crisis (1975),
Washington State Public Power default (1983), Orange County debt crisis
(1994), Asian financial meltdown (1997), and most recently and notably the
Enron collapse of 2001 and Worldcom bankruptcy of 2002.72 Post-Enron,
the financial markets and press realized that Moody's and S&P kept the
investment grade ratings on Enron up until five days before Enron filed for
bankruptcy.73 These repetitive failures on the part of the credit rating
63 Id. at Al.
64 Id. at Al.
65 Id. at Al.
66 David Wessel, And Then There Were Six.... Wall St. J. Economics Blog, Nov. 5,
2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2007/11/05/and-then-there-were-six (last visited
on 11/17/08).
67 Id.
68 Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Carrick Mollenkamp, CDO Ratings are Whacked by
Moody's, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2007, at B 1.
69 Id. at B 1.
70 Id. at B I.
7' The Great Global Meltdown of 2007 - Brought to you Courtesy of the SEC, PR
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 28, 2007.
72 Id.
73 White, supra note 24, at 51.
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agencies and subsequent call during the Enron and Worldcom debacles for
greater regulation and transparency led to the adoption of the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006 ("CRARA"). 7 4
IV. THE CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT OF 2006
President George W. Bush signed the CRARA on September 29,
2006. 7" The 1 0 9 th Congress moved the CRARA, then Senate Bill 3850,
very quickly through the congressional pathways as the bill was only
introduced twenty-three days earlier on September 6, 2006 by Senator
Richard Shelby.76 However, as Senator Shelby proclaimed just after the
CRARA was signed, the need for this bill was immediate:
"The dominant rating agencies failed millions of investors
by neglecting to lower their ratings on Enron, WorldCom
and other companies headed for bankruptcy . . . The
absence of timely downgrades in these cases was a product
of an industry that was beset by conflicts of interest and a
lack of competition. Ultimately, this compromised the
integrity of the market and investors paid the price."77
The text of the CRARA legislation itself even provided in its
Section Two findings why Congress found that credit rating agencies to be
of national importance. 78  To Congress the credit rating agencies are a
participant in interstate commerce; their issued ratings relate to the
securities issued by national banks and those of the Federal Reserve
System; the agencies "affect interstate commerce, the securities markets,
the national banking system and the national economy;" oversight is
imperative to investor protection; additional competition is necessary to the
public interest; and in order for oversight to occur, the SEC needs statutory
authority.7
9
The CRARA Section Four provides an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, inserting a new section entitled "SEC. 15E.
Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. 80
741d., at 48.
75 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, S. 3850 - 109"' Congress., GovTrack.us,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s1099-3850 (last visited 11/17/08).
76 Id.
77 Marie Leone, Bush Signs Rating Agency Reform Act, CFO.coM, Oct. 2, 2006,
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7991492/c7989907=TodayInFinance-Inside (last visited
11/17/08).
78 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. Public Law No. 109-29 1, Section 2, Sept. 29,
2006.
79 id.
80 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. Public Law No. 109-291, Section 4, Sept. 29,
2006.
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The areas legislated in the CRARA Section Four include, among others:
registration procedures for NRSRO's, update of the registration,
accountability for rating's procedures, registration suspension, denial or
termination, management of conflict of interests, prohibited conduct and
SEC authority of NRSROs.8  The most important and necessary parts of
this section are contained within the NRSRO registration process,
accountability of the NRSROs and the oversight authority of the SEC.
The CRARA provides a credit rating agency with at least three
consecutive years experience, immediately prior to the application, the
ability to submit an application to become registered as an NRSRO. 82 A
NRSRO application under the CRARA contains the following:
"(i) the credit ratings performance measurement statistics
over short-term, mid-term, and long-term periods (as
applicable) of the applicant;
(ii) the procedures and methodologies that the applicant
uses in determining credit ratings;
(iii) policies or procedures adopted and implemented by the
applicant to prevent the misuse, in violation of this title (or
the rules and regulations hereunder), or material, nonpublic
information;
(iv) the organizational structure of the applicant
(v) whether or not the applicant has in effect of a code of
ethics, and if not, the reasons therefor;
(vi) any conflict of interest relating to the issuance of credit
ratings by the applicant;
(vii) the categories described in any clauses (i) through (v)
of section 3(a)(62)(B) with respect to which the applicant
intends to apply for registration under this section;
(viii) on a confidential basis, a list of the 20 largest issuers
and subscribers that use the credit rating services of the
applicant, by amount of net revenues received therefrom in
the fiscal year immediately preceding the date of
submission of the application.
81 id.
82 Id.
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(ix) on a confidential basis, as to each applicable category
of obligor described in any clauses (i) through (v) of
section 3(a)(62)(B), written certifications described in
subparagraph (C), except as provided in subparagraph (D);
and
(x) any other information and documents concerning the
applicant and any person associated with such applicant as
the Commission, by rule may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. 83
The required written certifications of (B)(ix) (above) are provided
by at least ten qualified buyers not affiliated with the applicant and must
include more than two certifications for each category of obligor.
84
The CRARA § 15E(c) sets forth the accountability for the ratings
procedure and the basic authority of the SEC. 85 It grants the SEC the
authority to enforce the provisions of the CRARA to designated
NRSROs.86 This section specifically prohibits the SEC from regulating the
substance of the credit ratings or the procedures followed by the NRSROs
to determine the credit ratings.87 The CRARA, however, does permit the
SEC to censure, deny or suspend the registration of any NRSRO, if the SEC
believes it is necessary for the "protection of investors and in the public
interest."'
88
Additionally, the SEC is required to submit an annual report to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. 89 The annual report is
to include identified applicants for NRSRO status, the number of applicants
and any actions taken thereon as well as how the SEC views "competition,
transparency and conflicts of interest" in the credit rating agency market.90
On May 23, 2007, the SEC voted to adopt the final rules it would
use to implement the Congressional legislation of the CRARA. 91  In
adopting the final rules, the SEC took to heart the goal of the new law
espoused by its own chairman, Christopher Cox. Chairman Cox stated that
"the heart of the Act calls on the Commission to replace the barriers to
83 Id. at § (a)(1)(B).
4Id. at § (a)(1)(C).
85 CRARA, supra note 80, at § (c).
86 Id.
87 Id. at § (c)(2).
81 Id., at § (d).
89 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. Public Law No. 109-29 1, § 6, Sept. 29, 2006.
90 Id.
9' SEC Press Release, SEC Votes to Adopt Final Rules to Implement the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006. May 23, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-
104.htm (last visited 11/17/08).
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entry that had previously existed. The replacement is a transparent and
voluntary Commission registration system that favors no particular business
model. 92 The heart of the CRARA had barely begun to beat before the
sub-prime mortgage troubles took control of the market and investors.
V. CREDIT RATING AGENCY PROBLEMS
Inherent in the credit rating agency business model are warning
signs dictating to investors to be wary of relying too much on their
securities ratings. The most significant problems to the ratings firms are: a
monopolization of the credit rating industry segment and the huge potential
for conflicts of interest.
A. Duopoly on the Market
As stated previously, Moody's and S&P control the majority of the
credit rating market, with nearly an 80% segment combined. 93  This
situation results in a duopoly on the market as Fitch comes in as a strong,
but distant third in worldwide credit ratings. With such a duopoly, market
competition and economic efficiency suffer.94 While the long-term impact
of the CRARA remains to be seen, the Act attempts to open up the credit
rating market to new entrants seeking to gain a NRSRO designation. 95 The
legislation permits a credit rating firm, issuing ratings for at least three
years, to apply to be registered as an NRSRO with the SEC; incumbents,
namely Moody's, S&P and Fitch must also apply.96
Prior to the CRARA, NRSRO qualifications were never provided
by the SEC. Instead, agency applicants would request the designation just
to sit patiently by for the SEC to issue a "no action letter" guaranteeing no
enforcement action against any broker-dealer that used the agency
applicant's ratings. 97 Now, however, with the CRARA, after submitting
this information, the applicant's duty is simply to sit and await notification
from the SEC within ninety days of whether or not the SEC will designate
the applicant as a NRSRO, or whether a proceeding shall be instituted for
further inquiry. 98 The NRSRO designation is quintessential for a ratings
firm to become a part of the bond rating business, as many banks and
regulators will only take account of the NRSROs credit ratings. 99
92 Id.
93 Rupini Bergstrom, Bond Raters Get Subpoenas, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2007, at B2.
94 Dittrich, supra note 2, at 99.
95 White, supra note 24, at 51.
96 id.
97 White, supra note 6, at 5.
98 White, supra note 24 at 52.
99 White, supra note 6, at 4.
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Critical to achieving the NRSRO designation is obtaining the
business of issuers looking for ratings for their investments and securities.
With Moody's and S&P's duopoly over the market, reputation comes into
play as well. A large barrier to entry comes with new applicants vying for
the business of issuers who solely rely on the ratings of Moody's and S&P.
The majority of investors have name recognition with these two large
market participants which many of the smaller market players will simply
not have. No name recognition leads to a lack of reputation which can in
turn lead to little trust from the investors whom the issuers desire to buy
their securities and investments. While an extreme drop of investor
confidence in the ratings system currently might help the newer credit
rating outfits, it is up to the SEC to allow market entrants a regulated path
to entry, instead of stifling the competition along the way.
B. Conflict of Interest
Rating agencies inherently have a large conflict of interest since
they are paid by the issuers whose securities they rate.100 Numerous
statements to this effect have been made, both in Senate hearings and in the
market at large, including Former Senate Banking Chairman Richard
Shelby, who stated: "They're conflicted. It's driven by money, not
responsibility and ethics."' 1°  There is a complete lack of independent
assessment of credit risk. 10 2 Much of the exorbitant income for the credit-
rating agencies comes from their opinions on the bank-created, mortgage-
related securities. 103
The credit rating agencies use an issuer-pays business model
instead of a subscription model. In an issuer-pays model, it is the issuers,
not the investors who pay for the ratings. Ratings agencies are paid for the
actual, end-result rating, not for the preliminary work of creating the rating,
including researching, analyzing and gathering information.' 0 4 In the end,
if the issuer is unhappy with Moody's or S&P's output, the issuer "walk
away without paying a dime."' 0 5 Inherent in the issuer-pays model are
conflicts of interest, though the agencies are firm believers in their ability to
manage the conflicts. A group managing director at Moody's stated in a
Senate hearing that Moody's has "successfully managed related conflicts of
'00 Buttonwood, supra note 21, at 77. Refer to the pictorial in Part IIIA for a graphical
representation of the inter-workings of the ratings market.
'0' Dawn Kopecki, The Credit Ratings Blame Game, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2007.
102 Buttonwood, supra note 21, at 77
103 Aaron Lucchetti, Ratings Firms'Practices Get Rated, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2007, at
Cl.
104 Impact of Credit Agencies, supra note 23, at 10 (statement of Senator Wayne
Allard).
'o' Id. at 10.
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interest and provided the market with objective, independent, and unbiased
credit opinions."
0 6
In the current sub-prime mortgage crisis, the ratings agencies gave
investment grade ratings to CDOs, which included many of the late- to-
default mortgages. 107 The investment grades allowed Wall Street to sell the
bonds to the market, potentially easier than they would have been able to
without investment grade rating. 108 Additionally, while individual investors
saw their home values sharply decline while their mortgage interest rates
rose, "Moody's net income rose from $289 million in 2002 to $754 million
last year."' 1° 9
The problem with the issue-backed, credit rating agencies is that in
this type of system the issuers are the ones paying the agencies to rate their
investments and then pay a fee on top of the rating charge. "0 The investors
are the ones using this information to decide how to invest their monies,
though, not the issuers. The rating agencies argument, however, as
articulated by Vickie Tillman, Executive Vice-President of S&P's credit
marketing services, purports that there is no evidence is available to show
agencies acting in the interests of the issuers."' She touts her agency's
methodology of letting the issuers structure the deals, and then using
criteria that are "publicly available, non-negotiable and consistently
applied" to the transactions. 1 2 An analyst at Moody's Investor Services,
Teresa Wyszomierski, Vice President of Structured Finance Derivatives,
also commented, maintaining that Moody's "methodologies and models for
rating structured finance obligations are published on the their website and
are fully transparent, thereby making any digression immediately obvious
to market participants."' 13
Even though the ratings firms may argue their ratings have nothing
to do with the fees they are paid, the simple matter that they are paid by
firms for the ratings they give is enough to raise questions in terms of the
firms' reliability and independence. Though the ratings agencies disclose
the amounts they bring in to rate bonds, there needs to be transparency in
terms of whether those that sell more deals, generating more profits for the
ratings firms, also get better ratings. 14 Admittedly, there is no evidence
106 Kopecki, supra note 101.
107 Lucchetti, supra note 103, at C1.
'
0
' Id. at C1.
109 Buttonwood, supra note 2 1, at 77.
10 Norris, James. Rating Agencies: Heads I win, Tails you Lose, GLOBAL INVESTOR,
Sept. 2007.
... Vickie Tillman, How S&P Protects Integrity of Credit Ratings, WALL ST. J., Sept.
17, 2007, at A15.
1 21d.
113 Teresa Wyszomierski, Moody's Credit Ratings are Never 'Compromised', WALL ST.
J., Sept. 4, 2007, at A15.114 Lucchetti, supra note 103, at Cl.
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currently of this treatment, but there is also a lack of real investigation and
oversight of the agencies' processes at the same time." 5
The fact that there is a lesser known role of the ratings agencies of
helping the issuers place the best investments together in order to get the
highest potential rating for the investment to be marketable is
problematic. 1 6 Working in combination, the ratings firms and issuers
should not be able to scam the market. The ratings agencies should
maintain their independence, accepting payments from issuers regardless of
what the potential rating might be and only accepting securities and
investments for ratings consideration only when fully complete. Investors
should know this information, and yet it is often kept under wraps for fear
of investors losing confidence in the rating system. If investors lose
confidence, the markets for the new investments dry up, issuers become
less willing to pay for ratings, subsequently hurting revenue at both the
ratings firms and at Wall Street firms. "1
7
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
CRARA is not enough to fix the current problems within the
ratings firms and processes themselves. Originally, CRARA was aimed at
garnering more competition among the ratings firms by opening up the
NRSRO designation for potentially more market participants and giving the
SEC the ability to inspect the books and policies governing the ratings
firms."18 However, even if the SEC were to find something wrong in the
system, the SEC is prohibited from second-guessing rating decisions."
9
Congress should not wait to see in a few years how the 2006
CRARA will impact the financial markets and credit rating agencies.
Previous inaction on the parts of the SEC and Congress should motivate
"Congressional committees into remedying the abusive practices of the
credit-rating agencies."' 120 More agencies need to enter the market. While
arguments could be made that more agencies would create incentive for
issuers to shop around for firms with the weakest standard, investor
confidence and agency reputation would be at stake, thus eliminating the
potential for shopping.' 
2
'
Three years of experience, as required by CRARA and the SEC,
could very well serve to be impossible for new NRSRO applicants. The
'15 Id.
16 Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Credit and Blame: How Rating Firms' Call Fueled
Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at Al.
117 Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 60, at Al.
118 Kopecki, supra note 101.
119 Id.
120 The Great Global Meltdown of 2007 -Brought to you Courtesy of the SEC, supra
note 70.
12 1 Buttonwood, supra note 21, at 77.
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SEC and Congress need to reevaluate the application process for a NRSRO
designation. This is not a recommendation to allow just any company the
designation, as the designation does connote authority and power above the
rest. Instead, this is a call for the barriers of entry to be lowered while the
standards for ratings are raised exponentially. The SEC and Congress need
to permit more NRSRO designations with the caveat that the designation
can and will be revoked at the SEC's sole discretion. Obtaining the
NRSRO designation should not be the key to entry into the market; a credit
rating agency keeping the designation, however, is where all of the SEC
power should lie.
Transparency and better monitoring on the part of the SEC is
essential to a new CRARA. Agencies should be forced to follow the
securities and bonds once they are rated so that it will be clearer if and
when to downgrade these securities later on. 122 While this is less lucrative
for the ratings agencies, this will help to improve investor confidence and
the firms' reputations in the long run. 123  Currently, CRARA does not
permit the SEC to extend its authority into the substance of each agency's
ratings-namely, procedures and methodologies. 124 Admittedly, a balance
is needed so to not undermine the foundational business model and still
permit the agencies to make money. While it is not recommended for the
SEC to mandate a national rating system, allowing the SEC to become
more involved in the process would thwart conflicts of interest and promote
competition within the industry.' 
25
Processes could also be put into place to make the regulations less
dependent on the ratings, using instead market values.126 However, prices
can be volatile, and that might require banks to hold more reserves to guard
against price moves. For example, it would not make sense to say that the
securities are more accurate than the market. If a security is trading at 80
cents on the dollar, it is no use saying that S&P rates it AAA; the extra
$0.20 will not magically appear because an agency says so. Additionally,
changing the entire system of rating investments would prove to undermine
any amount of residual investor confidence in the U.S. financial markets.
Another potential option for change in the current investment
ratings system would be to revert to the subscriber model of rating
agencies. Prior to 1975, rating agencies were not issuer-backed. Instead,
they were subscriber-backed with investors, those using the ratings to
122 id.
123 Id.
124 Impact of Credit Agencies, supra note 23, at 11 (statement of Senator Mel
Martinez).125 Impact of Credit Agencies, supra note 23, at 11 (statement of Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox).
126 Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are not like Other
Gatekeepers, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-46, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=900257 (last visited on 9/21/08).
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determine where to invest their monies, paying the credit rating agencies.
This methodology would allow for a greater independence on the part of the
credit rating agencies, while also instilling confidence in investors with
more control in their hands.
The SEC also needs to reevaluate its system of granting an NRSRO
statute to a credit rating agency. Competition in the credit rating market is
the biggest key factor to helping solve the current lack of confidence in the
marketplace. While perhaps a naive hope, competition should be based on
performance of the agencies. 127 Previously, the SEC has not provided the
market, nor has it had access to the historical default rates for accuracy of
securities rated by the designated NRSROs. 128 The SEC should mandate
reporting from the credit agencies of the progress of their ratings, to
subsequently track the default rates and each agencies correlative rating.
By providing greater transparency, the SEC will open the marketplace to
those competitors providing reliable ratings and information to the
marketplace.
Lastly, it is not recommended for investors to pursue legal
retaliation against the credit rating agencies for their inability to correctly
assess the situation. In 2003, the ratings agencies deflected lawsuits
through relying on their motto that the ratings are simply opinions of the
potential for default and should not be seen as guarantees.129 As to their
opinions, the credit ratings agencies can rely on the First Amendment for
protection.13  Unless evidence were to surface proving the agencies
"knowingly deceived its clients," any prosecution would fail. 31
VII. CONCLUSION
In order for the credit rating agencies to truly have the impact
envisioned by the SEC restoration of confidence is essential. Awaiting the
results of the CRARA, without more implementation and caution for the
current faults in the system will feed into the slow, non-reactional
bureaucracy that exists currently. Oversight needs to be implemented and
maintained so that investors at home and abroad will have confidence in a
system restored.
127 Impact of Credit Agencies, supra note 23, at 17 (statement of Senator John Sununu).128 Impact of Credit Agencies, supra note 23, at 17 (statement of Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox).
129 James Norris, Rating Agencies: heads I win, tails you lose..., GLOBAL INVESTOR.
September 2007.
130 Yael Bizouati, A Matter of Opinion: Rating agencies are under the gun, but proving
wrongdoing will be difficult, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST. Sept. 10, 2007.
13 Norris, supra note 129.
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